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Maurizio Ferraris, Enrico Terrone
LIKE GIANTS IMMERSED IN TIME. ONTOLOGY, 
PHENOMENOLOGY, AND MARCEL PROUST*1
Abstract
Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, raises an interesting philosophical issue, namely, 
how can one be in touch with past things if they no longer exist? It provides us with a 
way to address this issue by outlining an ontological view according to which past things 
still exist within a four-dimensional world. Although one cannot be in touch with past 
things by means of ordinary perception, one can do so by combining perception and 
memory. In this sense, In Search of Lost Time helps us to reconcile a four-dimensionalist 
ontology according to which things have both spatial and temporal parts with a realist 
phenomenology according to which experience gives us access to things as they are. 
In so doing, Proust’s masterpiece allows us to shed some light on what it means for a 
subject of experience to exist in a four-dimensional world. 
1. It no longer exists but I can perceive it 
Many years have passed since that night. The wall of the staircase up which I had 
watched the light of his candle gradually climb was long ago demolished [n’existe plus 
depuis longtemps]. And in myself, too, many things have perished which I imagined 
would last for ever, and new ones have arisen, giving birth to new sorrows and new 
joys which in those days I could not have foreseen, just as now the old are hard to 
understand. It is a long time, too, since my father has been able to say to Mamma: 
1 Both authors made equal contributions to the project of this paper. Maurizio Ferraris directly 
wrote sections 2 and 5, Enrico Terrone sections 1, 3 and 4. The paper was presented at “Meta-
physical Questions: An International Conference” (Università degli Studi di Milano, Palazzo 
Feltrinelli, Gargnano sul Garda, Brescia, 29 October 2015) and at “Philosophical Symposium: 
Composition as Diversity - Experiencing Ontological Wholes” (Scuola di Dottorato in Scienze 
Umanistiche e della Società, Università di Ferrara, 3 June 2015). The authors want to thank the 
organizers and the audiences of these events.
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“Go along with the child”. Never again will such moments be possible for me. But of 
late I have been increasingly able to catch, if I listen attentively, the sound of the sobs 
which I had the strength to control in my father’s presence, and which broke out only 
when I found myself alone with Mamma. In reality their echo has never ceased; and it 
is only because life is now growing more and more quiet round about me that I hear 
them anew, like those convent bells which are so effectively drowned during the day by 
the noises of the street that one would suppose them to have stopped, until they ring 
out again through the silent evening air2. 
As evidenced by the phrases we have italicized, this passage from Swann’s 
Way contains two opposing elements. On the one hand, Proust tells us that 
the world of his childhood no longer exists, on the other he claims to be able 
to perceive it. Given that perception is a factive mental state, which implies 
the existence of its objects, perceiving “the sound of the sobs which I had the 
strength to control in my father’s presence, and which broke out only when 
I found myself alone with Mamma” signifies the existence of those sobs. This 
seems to contradict the previous statement that “The wall of the staircase up 
which I had watched the light of his candle gradually climb was long ago de-
molished” – unless a child’s sobs have a more robust ontological status than a 
stairway, which seems implausible.
The philosophical significance of this literary contradiction has been analyzed 
by Emanuele Lago3 in his essay La volontà di potenza e il passato [The Will to 
Power and the Past], in the chapter entitled “Proust, Nietzsche, Gentile, and 
the impossibility of the will to power”. First of all, Lago highlights Proust’s 
contradiction: “By arguing that the past continues to be perceived, does not 
Proust (like the Western speculative tradition to which he refers) fall into the 
most obvious contradiction? Is he not saying that the thing ceases and yet does 
not cease to exist, that it is annulled (because it passes) and yet is not annulled 
(because it continues to be perceived)?”4. Secondly, Lago focuses on the strate-
gy that Proust uses to solve this contradiction. This strategy consists in giving 
memory the task of making the perception of the past possible by guaranteeing 
its being. This presupposes an “idealist” conception of the relationship between 
memory and the past, by which the being of the latter depends on the thinking 
subject and her memory: “This conception of memory as unconscious survival 
of the past is the way in which Proust, in the wake of Bergson, expresses the 
fundamental meaning of memory in the Western tradition. It is essentially a way to 
preserve what exists and keep it in the sphere of being, saving it from the robbery 




of nothingness”5. In this way, the past “remains in the depths of the soul (those 
depths that are for the artist to probe)”6. 
However, according to Lago, Proust’s solution is contradictory: on the one 
hand, the past preserved by memory is subtracted from the flow of becoming; 
on the other hand, the past, as being in time, has the essential characteristic of 
becoming – of passing from being to nothing – otherwise there would be no 
need for memory to preserve it. That is to say, the past has the essential char-
acteristic of becoming, but memory preserves the past without this essential 
characteristic; therefore memory does not really preserve the past. 
Lago’s conclusion is that in order to solve this problem it is necessary to dis-
miss Proust and turn instead to Gentile and Nietzsche, two philosophers well 
aware that “the evidence of becoming is necessarily connected with the idea 
that nothing may exist outside of its relationship with it”7. From this principle, 
however, Gentile and Nietzsche draw opposite consequences.
Gentile claims that the past is unreal, and therefore it is impossible to expe-
rience it through memory, which instead “creates it from scratch”8. Thus, the 
moderate idealism that Lago attributes to Proust (for which memory preserves 
the past) gives way to Gentile’s radical idealism (for which memory creates the 
past). Nietzsche’s solution instead consists in affirming that the past continues 
to become independently of memory; what makes this possible is the eternal 
return, such that: «Every moment (every configuration of the world) is the iden-
tical recreation of the most remote past»9. This solution can be seen as a kind 
of prodigal realism, in the sense that it affirms the reality of the past (which is 
why it is a form of realism), but it does so by multiplying events at will (which 
is why it is prodigal).
In what follows, we will argue that there is another strategy to solve the 
Proustian contradiction between the alleged nonexistence of the past and the 
fact that it can be experienced. This strategy does not require resorting to either 
Gentile or Nietzsche; it does not oblige us to endorse either the radical idealism 
of the former or the prodigal realism of the latter. Proust’s contradiction can in 
fact be addressed and resolved within Proust’s very text. To this end, however, 
we need to move from the beginning of In Search of Lost Time to its final vol-
ume, Time Regained, where the Proustian conception of the past clearly turns 
out to be realistic rather than idealistic. In fact, for Proust, the past continues 







similar to that in which perception experiences the present. This form of realism 
about the past is quite distinct from the Nietzschean eternal return, for which 
the past continues to exist, repeating itself endlessly. In Proust’s perspective, 
one occurrence alone is sufficient for a past event to exist eternally. This is the 
conception of time that, in contemporary philosophy, goes under the name of 
four-dimensionalism.
2. Ontology 
In Search of Lost Time has been the object of various philosophical readings, 
both on the “analytic” side10 and on the “continental” side11. Here, we intend 
to read it as a philosophical Bildungsroman in which one learns a new way of 
looking at things, a new modality to experience time. From this point of view, 
the passage from lost time to time regained is not a change in the nature of 
time itself, but in the way we experience it. Time remains there, where it has 
always been. It was lost because one was no longer able to see it; it is regained 
when one finds a way to see it again: “like those convent bells which are so 
effectively drowned during the day by the noises of the street that one would 
suppose them to have stopped, until they ring out again through the silent 
evening air”. The bells do not actually resume playing; they never stopped, yet 
one did not know how to listen to them. Similarly, the past does not return to 
reality; it has always been real, yet one was no longer able to see it. When one 
learns to see it again, time is regained.
This reading of In Search of Lost Time can be clarified by using the theoret-
ical tools made available by the debate on time and the experience of time in 
contemporary philosophy. In accordance with the image of the world derived 
from Einstein’s theory of relativity, philosophers such as Quine12, Mellor13, 
Varzi14 and Sider15 conceive of time as a fourth spatial dimension, and therefore 
only consider the notions of precedence between temporal instants along this 
dimension. Instead, for them, the characteristics of past, present or future that 
are usually attributed to the temporal instants in the manifest image of the world 
are simple subjective appearances. Let us call “Einsteinian image” the image of 
the world endorsed by these philosophers.
10 For instance, Bonomi 1987.






Borrowing McTaggart’s16 terminology, the Einsteinian image involves a 
B-theory of time, which attributes reality only to temporal relations of prece-
dence between instants; instead, an A-theory of time also attributes reality to 
the properties of “being past”, “being present” or “being future”, which can be 
attributed to individual instants. Moreover, the einsteinian image is eternalist 
because the existence of something does not depend on its temporal position; 
instead, according to the presentist conception, only that which enjoys the 
property of being present exists. Finally, the einsteinian image is four-dimension-
alist, because it conceives of concrete objects as extended not only in space but 
also in time; instead, according to a three-dimensionalist conception, objects 
are essentially spatial and therefore three-dimensional: they do not extend in 
time, but rather change over time. Thus, according to three-dimensionalism, 
an object can be wholly present at a single point in time whereas, according to 
four-dimensionalism, the object fills time with its temporal parts just as it fills 
space with its spatial parts. 
The conception of time that emerges from In Search of Lost Time surely is 
four-dimensionalist, even though it does not explicitly endorse a B-theory of 
time or eternalism. Consider how the Narrator describes Combray’s church: “an 
edifice occupying, so to speak, a four dimensional space – the name of the fourth 
being Time”17. Or consider the ending passage in which the Narrator sees the 
participants in the Guermantes matinee as “giants immersed in time”18, whose 
appearance is the visible, three-dimensional part of a four-dimensional body 
that has its roots in the past. This is Proust’s four-dimensionalism, which, in the 
domain of literary studies, has been nicely highlighted by Richard Durán19 in 
his paper Fourth-Dimensional Time and Proust’s ‘A la recherche du temps perdu’. 
In principle, four-dimensionalism does not necessarily imply that the present 
lacks reality and all moments, past, present and future, exist all together in a 
single eternal whole. That is to say that four-dimensionalism does not per se 
imply the B-theory of time and eternalism. There are two main options in this 
regard. If one supports the A-theory together with eternalism and four-dimen-
sionalism, one is endorsing a moving spotlight theory20. According to this view, 
the universe exists as an eternal four-dimensional block, but inside it there is 
a privileged moment, the present, which moves along the temporal dimension 
of the four-dimensional block as if there were a moving spotlight illuminating 
the various instants one at a time. If instead one maintains the A-theory and 
16 McTaggart 1908.
17 Proust 1913-1927: 66.
18 Ibidem: 1012.
19 Durán 1991.
20 See Cameron 2015.
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four-dimensionalism, but not eternalism, one is endorsing a growing block the-
ory21, for which the four-dimensional universe is built as the bar of the present 
moves forward from the past to the future.
The four-dimensional conception of reality, in principle, is compatible 
with both moving spotlight theory and growing block theory. It is instead 
incompatible with presentism, the thesis that only what is present exists. In 
fact, presentism involves not only the adoption of the A-theory (otherwise the 
notion of present would have no ontological relevance) but also the rejection 
of four-dimensionalism (because if only the present exists, then – given that 
the present is point-like – there can be no four-dimensional entities). If one 
endorses presentism, three-dimensionalism is the only choice, and from that 
perspective Proust’s statement that «the sobs which I had the strength to control 
in my father’s presence» have never ceased reveals itself to be nothing more than 
a poetic metaphor; the sobs, belonging to the past, have ceased a long time ago, 
because only the present really exists. If one wants to treat these sobs as truly 
real, four-dimensionalism is the only available option.
3. Phenomenology and Epistemology 
A point in favor of three-dimensionalism seems to be its conformity with the 
phenomenology and epistemology of ordinary experience. If we look around, we 
see three-dimensional objects, not four-dimensional ones. So, three-dimension-
alism can take perceptual experience at face value, while four-dimensionalism 
seems forced to provide an “error theory”22, that is, an explanation of why we 
perceive three-dimensional objects if in reality the world is made up of four-di-
mensional entities. 
As we will see, Proust offers us an alternative to this error theory: the point 
is not to explain why our perception is wrong, but rather to make it truthful, 
enriching it with the contribution of memory. But before proceeding to analyze 
the proustian solution, let us try to clarify the scope of the problem. To this end, 
consider Peter Strawson’s criticism of four-dimensionalism in his book Individuals:
So some philosophers have reasoned, making their point by saying, for example, that 
‘Caesar’ is the name of a series of events, a biography. In so reasoning, they may be said 
to draw attention to the possibility of our recognizing a category of objects which we 
do not in fact recognize: a category of four-dimensional objects, which might be called 
‘process-things’, and of which each of the temporally successive parts is three-dimensional, 
is, as it were, the thing taken at successive stages of its history from the beginning to the 
end. But the way in which I have to describe these objects shows that they are not to 
21 See Broad 1923.
22 Cf. Mackie 1977.
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be identified either with the processes which things undergo or with the things which 
undergo them. I remarked earlier that I was concerned to investigate the relations of 
identifiability-dependence between the available major categories, the categories we 
actually possess; and the category of process-things is one we neither have nor need23. 
There is something puzzling in this argument. Why does Strawson presuppose 
that we lack the category of process-things? This is not very clear. Consider the 
individual we are referring to when we say, for example, “Socrates was a wise 
man”. What metaphysical category does he belong to? It is not obvious whether 
we are speaking of a three-dimensional thing (like a body) or of a process-thing 
(like a biography, a whole life). 
In fact, Strawson’s point seems to be that one cannot perceive process-things. 
One only perceives three-dimensional objects. Therefore, one can only identify 
and recognize (and speak of ) three-dimensional objects, not process-things.
Still, one does not need to perceive an object in its entirety in order to iden-
tify it. One can identify an object by simply perceiving a spatial part of it. As 
Alva Noë24 pointed out, one experiences a tomato as a voluminous ovoid even 
though one only sees one side of it. Perception rests upon “synecdoches”, i.e. 
parts standing for a whole. We can draw on this to establish an experiential 
analogy between the experience of space and that of time. As a two-dimensional 
facet can stand for a three-dimensional spatial whole, so a three-dimensional 
“facet” can stand for a four-dimensional spatiotemporal whole. In this sense, 
the temporal dimension of a four-dimensional entity is a sort of hidden depth. 
This leads us to a significant experiential analogy between space and time: just 
as one has access to objective space (which can be represented by a map) by 
experiencing egocentric perspectival space (centered in the place where our 
body is), one also has access to objective time (which can be represented by a 
calendar) by experiencing egocentric perspectival time (centered in the time at 
which our perception occurs). 
However, there is also a significant experiential disanalogy between space 
and time. As Merleau Ponty25 observed, “I know that objects have several facets 
because I could make a tour of inspection of them”, and yet one cannot make 
a tour of inspection of a four-dimensional entity. 
Nevertheless, one can experience further temporal facets of such a four-di-
mensional entity by means of memory. Surely, in terms of pure perception, one 
can only have temporal experience of three-dimensional objects. Yet temporal 
experience is rarely, if ever, pure perception: it is rather a combination of percep-
tion and memory. This becomes evident in memory-based (or retention-based) 
23 Strawson 1959: 56-57.
24 Noë 2006.
25 Merleau-Ponty 1945; engl. tr. 1962: 94.
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accounts of temporal experience offered by philosophers such as Augustine, 
Kant, Brentano, Husserl, James, or Bergson. 
An interesting example in this sense the experience of a musical interval, say, 
C-E. This experience results from the conjunction of the very recent memory of 
C with the current perception of E. In Brentano’s terms, this experience has two 
components, namely, aesthesis, which represents-as-present E, and proter-aesthesis, 
which represents-as-recent-past C26. 
Musical intervals, qua sounds, are paradigmatic process-things. One does not 
experience sounds as wholly present entities that can last over time or change, 
but rather as entities made up of temporal parts. As David Velleman27 put it, a 
sound “doesn’t move with respect to time; it merely extends newer and newer 
temporal parts to fill each successive moment”. Four-dimensionalism can be 
seen as the ontological claim that all things exist in the way sounds exist. In 
other words, all things are process-things, which, as Proust puts it “are larger 
than the moment in which they occur and cannot be entirely contained in it”28. 
The experience of process-things relies on the experiential component in 
between perception and memory, which Brentano  –  as seen above  –  calls 
“proter-aesthesis”, and Husserl “adumbration”. Interestingly, Husserl uses this 
term to indicate not only the retention of a previous temporal state, but also 
the perception of a spatial facet of a concrete object. As regards adumbrations 
in the temporal dimension, he observes: “The past must be represented in this 
now as past, and this is accomplished through the continuity of adumbrations 
that in one direction terminates in the sensation-point and in the other direction 
becomes blurred and indeterminate”29. In a similar vein, James introduces the 
notion of a “specious present”, which he characterizes in the following terms: 
“We seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its two ends embedded 
in it”30. 
Drawing on these insights on temporal experience, we can conceive of mem-
ory as a way of extending “the interval of time as a whole”. That is to say that 
memory is as a way of looking beyond the point that “becomes blurred and 
indeterminate” in perception and retention. This brings us to the epistemological 
view called direct realism, according to which remembering involves a direct 
relation to what exists in the past31, just as perceiving involves a direct relation 
26 Cf. Kriegel 2015.
27 Velleman 2006: 13.
28 Proust 1913-1927: 408.
29 Husserl 1928; engl. tr. 1991: 290.
30 James 1890: 574.
31 Cf. Bergson 1896; Russell 1913.
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to what exists in the present32. A direct relation, unlike a representation, entails 
the existence of both its relata, namely, the mental state of perceiving or remem-
bering on the one hand, and what is perceived or remembered on the other. 
According to canonical direct realism about perception, by perceiving we 
enjoy a direct relation to three-dimensional objects. But what parts of reality 
are we related to by remembering? A reasonable answer seems to be: facets of 
four-dimensional objects. If this is right, also direct realism about perception 
might ultimately concern facets of four-dimensional objects. This conclusion is 
rather sympathetic with Bergson’s view, for which three-dimensional objects are 
nothing but abstractions isolated from a (four-dimensional) whole by abstract 
thought.
In Time Regained, Proust explicitly connects direct realism about memory to 
a four-dimensional ontology. He suggests an account according to which “the 
mental effort of combining eye and memory” allows us to experience objects 
for what they really are, that is, “monsters occupying a place in Time infinitely 
more important than the restricted one reserved for them in space, a place, on 
the contrary, prolonged immeasurably since simultaneously touching widely sep-
arated years and the distant periods they have lived through – between which so 
many days have ranged themselves – they stand like giants immersed in Time”33. 
Here, Proust reveals himself to be an ontological realist about the past (that is, 
a four-dimensionalist), and an epistemological realist about memory (that is, a 
direct realist). He believes that the past exists independently of experience and 
thought (ontological realism), but also thinks that memory, as such, puts us in 
touch with the reality of the past (epistemological realism). In contemporary 
philosophy, epistemological realism – or direct realism – is primarily adopted 
in philosophy of perception34. However, if we consider perception and memory 
as components of a unitary system of experience, then we have good reasons 
to follow Proust and extend epistemological realism also to memory, thereby 
making the temporal experience compliant with a four-dimensionalist ontology. 
4. The atemporal self 
From a four-dimensionalist perspective, all things are process-things. However, 
to argue that a chair is a four-dimensional entity of which we only perceive a 
three-dimensional facet is one thing, but to claim the same about ourselves is 
quite different. In particular, conceiving of the self as a process-thing leads to 
the following issues: if me-at-t1 (in the past) and me-at-t2 (in the present) are 
32 Cf. Strawson 1979; Snowdon 1998.
33 Proust 1913-1927: 1012.
34 See Martin 2002.
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both facets of a four-dimensional self, then why, at t2, can I only be aware of 
my experience at t2 and not also of my experience at t1? In what sense does 
my experience at t1 still exist as a facet of my four-dimensional self? Can there 
be such a thing as an experience of mine which exists without being currently 
enjoyed by me? 
One way to address these questions consists in stating that, at t2, I cannot 
enjoy my experience at t1 because myself-at-t2 can only enjoy my experience 
at t2. That is to say that, at t2, me-at-t1 is out of my reach just as the hidden 
face of an object. And yet, this raises a new question: namely, does the experience 
of me-at-t1 still exist as an experience? We are going to consider three ways to 
answer this new question. The first refers to Bergson’s philosophy, the second 
to Berkeley’s, and the third to Proust’s. 
At the ontological level, the first, Bergson-inspired strategy combines four-di-
mensionalism with the A-theory and the growing-block theory or the moving 
spotlight theory. In other words, we are in a four-dimensional world in which 
time actually flows. What results is a growing (or moving) self that has experi-
ence only in the present moment (the temporal point where the block grows or 
the spotlight moves). This seems rather close to the view endorsed by Bergson. 
From this perspective, we can keep thinking of the self as a four-dimensional 
entity, but we are forced to ascribe to its present facet (me-at-t2) a feature 
that its past facets (me-at-t1) currently lack, namely conscious experience. As 
Brad Skow35 puts it, “Of all the experiences I will ever have, some of them are 
special. Those are the ones that I am having now. All those others are ghostly 
and insubstantial”. 
The second, Berkeley-inspired strategy, instead, combines four-dimensionalism 
with the B-theory. We are therefore in a four-dimensional world in which the 
passing of time is only an appearance. What results is a series of “momentary 
selves” such that “you are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance 
to support them”, as Berkeley wrote in his Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous. The unitary enduring self is nothing but an appearance, just as the 
passage of time. From this perspective, both me-at-t2 (in the past) and me-at-t1 
(in the present) exist in the same way, namely as (stage-bounded) floating ideas 
or momentary selves. The unitary self and its sense of presentness are just an 
illusory effect common to all these floating ideas. 
In his paper Self, Mind and Body, Peter Strawson summarized this view – which 
nevertheless he does not endorse – in the following terms: “Wherever you say 
there’s one continuing soul-substance, I say there’s a whole series of them each 
of which transmits its states and the consciousness of them, to its successor, as 
motion might be transmitted from one to another of a whole series of elastic 
35 Skow 2009: 677, §4.
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balls”36. In his book Selves, Galen Strawson37 – Peter’s son – endorses and de-
velops such an insight, building up a fully-fledged theory of personal identity 
according to which the unitary self is nothing but a series of short-living selves. 
Contemporary philosophers who embrace a similar conception of the self also 
include Daniel Dennett38 and Laurie Paul39. 
The third, Proust-inspired strategy also combines four-dimensionalism and 
the B-theory, but without seeing the self as nothing but a system of floating 
ideas or short-living selves. According to this strategy, the reality of the self is not 
reduced to a mere series of momentary selves; the self rather exists as a whole 
made up of momentary selves, which are its temporal parts. This is Proust’s 
theory of an “atemporal self ”, which lies outside of time and can have several 
experiences at different times (me-at-t1, me-at-t2... ) all at once. This Proustian 
conception of the self has been criticized by Jonathan Dancy in his paper New 
Truths in Proust? 40 and by Gregory Currie in Can There Be a Literary Philosophy 
of Time? 41 Both Dancy and Currie argue that there is no way to make sense of 
this notion of an atemporal self. In what follows, we shall defend Proust from 
Dancy’s and Currie’s criticism by connecting his notion of an atemporal self to 
his four-dimensionalist ontology. 
The idea is that the momentary self is a facet of the atemporal self, just as, 
from a four-dimensionalist perspective, a three-dimensional concrete object is 
a facet of a four-dimensional concrete object. In Velleman’s terms, “I would 
think of myself as filling time rather than passing through it or having it pass 
me by – as existing in time the way a rooted plant exists in space, growing ex-
tensions to occupy it without moving in relation to it. Having shed the illusion 
of an enduring self, I would have lost any sense of time as passing at all”42. 
From this perspective, “atemporal self ” does not means a self absolutely out-
side time, unlike what Paul Ricoeur43 argues in his interpretation of In Search 
of Lost Time. Rather “atemporal self ” means a self outside the passage of time. 
The atemporal self is outside time only in the sense that it extends in time 
instead of enduring in time. This is the core of Durán’s44 criticism of Ricoeur’s 










interpretation. Drawing on some insights from Gerard Genette’s essay Proust 
palimpseste 45, Durán states that
Ricoeur’s distinction between the extra-temporal and the recapture of lost time is 
not only needless, it is invalid. As the text indicates, only the narrator’s extra-temporal 
being – his being outside of the vehicle – can recapture lost time. In effect, the ‘ex-
tra-temporal,’ the ‘timeless,’ the ‘eternal,’ ‘temps à l’état pur,’ the ‘recapture of lost time’ 
or ‘time regained’ are analogous. They all reside outside passing time in synchronic 
total time (1991: 79). 
5. In Search of Lost Time, or the Children’s Crusade
Even though all momentary “diachronic” selves exist as parts of an atemporal 
“syncronic” self, some of them can get close to the being of the atemporal self 
they make up. One can guess what it is like to be such a privileged atemporal 
self in special experiences like those described by Proust: 
And I began to discover the cause by comparing those varying happy impressions 
which had the common quality of being felt simultaneously at the actual moment and 
at a distance in time, because of which common quality the noise of the spoon upon the 
plate, the unevenness of the paving-stones, the taste of the madeleine, imposed the past 
upon the present and made me hesitate as to which time I was existing in. Of a truth, 
the being within me which sensed this impression, sensed what it had in common in 
former days and now, sensed its extra-temporal character, a being which only appeared 
when through the medium of the identity of present and past, it found itself in the only 
setting in which it could exist and enjoy the essence of things, that is, outside Time. That 
explained why my apprehensions on the subject of my death had ceased from the moment 
when I had unconsciously recognised the taste of the little madeleine because at that 
moment the being that I then had been was an extra-temporal being and in consequence 
indifferent to the vicissitudes of the future 46. 
In the passages we have italicized, Proust seems to embrace not only four-di-
mensionalism but also the B-theory and eternalism. In fact, like the past and 
the present, the future also falls under the jurisdiction of the atemporal self. In 
particular, “apprehensions on the subject of my death had ceased” because the 
atemporal self was already dead, and always had been: its death is nothing but 
the limit of its time scope, just as its birth. 
In this passage of Time Regained, Proust goes on to talk about the relationship 
between atemporal self and the momentary selves that make it up: 
45 Genette 1966.
46 Proust 1913-1927: 904, our emphasis.
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That being had never come to me, had never manifested itself except when I was 
inactive and in a sphere beyond the enjoyment of the moment, that was my prevailing 
condition every time that analogical miracle had enabled me to escape from the present. 
Only that being had the power of enabling me to recapture former days, Time Lost, in 
the face of which all the efforts of my memory and of my intelligence came to nought47. 
Here, the atemporal self, “that being”, looks like an omniscient alien visitor 
that can appear to the temporary selves and reveal their very essence to them. 
This allows us to draw, in conclusion, a comparison between In Search of Lost 
Time and another masterpiece of twentieth-century literature, namely Kurt 
Vonnegut’s novel Slaughterhouse-Five, or The Children’s Crusade. 
An extra-temporal being manifests itself to the Narrator of In Search of Lost 
Time just as the Tralfamadorians, the alien creatures who know the truth about 
the nature of time, appear to Billy Pilgrim in Slaughterhouse-Five. Like Proust’s 
atemporal self, “The Tralfamadorians can look at the different moments just 
the way we can look at a stretch of the Rocky Mountains, for instance. They 
can see how permanent all the moments are, and they can look at any moment 
that interests them”48. Other significant analogies can be drawn in this respect. 
For instance, as in Time Regained the Narrator sees Princesse de Guermantes’s 
guests old and worn out, but can also glimpse their lively and sparkling past, 
so in Slaughterhouse-Five, “When a Tralfamadorian sees a corpse, all he thinks 
is that the dead person is in bad condition in that particular moment, but that 
the same person is just fine in plenty of other moments”49. And as the Nar-
rator sees Princesse de Guermantes’s guests “like giants immersed in time”, so 
“Tralfamadorians don’t see human beings as two-legged creatures, either. They 
see them as great millepedes –  ‘with babies’ legs at one end and old people’s 
legs at the other”50.
In his paper So It Goes, David Velleman51 treated Slaughterhouse-Five as an 
insightful literary reflection on the four-dimensionalist ontology and on what 
the latter involves for a conception of the self. In this paper, we have shown 
that In Search of Lost Time can be read in a similar way. On opposite sides of 
the Atlantic and of the Twentieth century, In Search of Lost Time and Slaughter-
house-Five exploit the power of literature in order to unfold the apparent passage 
of time into an eternal four-dimensional manifold. In this way, they shed some 
light on what it means to exist as a momentary part of an atemporal being.
47 Ibidem, our emphasis.
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